Allahabad High Court Judgement

Allahabad High Court Judgement

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JUDGEMENT HEADLINE : Mag. Can Grant Bail In Offences Under SC/ST Act Not Punishable With Death Or Life Imprisonment.
JUDGEMENT TITLE : Saroj Kumar Upadhyaya Vs. Highcourt Of Judicature At Alld. Thru Registrar General &Anr On 19/07/2007 By Allahabad High Court
CASE NO : WRIT - A NO. 41339 OF 2005
CORAM : Hon'ble Yatindra Singh,J. And Hon'ble Raghunath Kishore Rastogi,J.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

RESERVED

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 41339 Of 2005

Saroj Kumar Upadhyay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Petitioner.
Versus
High Court Of Judicature At
Allahabad And Another . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Respondents.
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Hon'ble Yatindra Singh,J.
Hon'ble R.K. Rastogi,J.

( Delivered By Hon. R.K.Rastogi,J.)
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This Is A Writ Petition To Quash The Inquiry Report Dated 30.1.2004 Against The Petitioner And The Order Of Dismissal From Service Passed Against Him On 13.4.2005 And For A Direction To The Respondents To Reinstate Him In Service With Full Pay.
The Facts Relevant For Disposal Of This Petition Are That The Petitioner Was A Member Of Judicial Service Of The State. He Was Suspended And An Inquiry Was Instituted Against Him. A Charge Sheet Was Submitted On 3.5.2002 Containing 46 Charges. The Inquiry Officer Submitted His Report On 30.1.2004. He Discharged The Petitioner In Respect Of Charges No. 5 And 28 And Held Him Guilty For All The Remaining Charges. The Inquiry Report After Considering The Representation Of The Petitioner Was Approved By The Full Court On 5.2.2005 And Thereafter Of The Petitioner Was Dismissed From Service On 13.4.2005, Hence, This Writ Petition.
We Have Heard Learned Counsel For The Petitioner And Sri Amit Sthaleker, Learned Counsel For The Respondents.
Charge No.1 Framed Against The Petitioner Relates To Illegal Acquittal Of Accused Persons. The Remaining Charges Relate To Illegal Grant Of Bail And Illegal Release Of Vehicles In Criminal Cases. Out Of These Charges, Charges No. 2 To 38 Were In Respect Of Grant Of Bail In Those Cases Which Were Punishable With Life Imprisonment But Could Be Tried By Magistrate. Charge No. 39 Relates To Discrimination In Grant Of Bail In An Offence Under The Prevention Of Cow Slaughter Act, Charges No. 40 To 43 Relate To Grant Of Bail Without Jurisdiction And To Illegal Discrimination In Grant Of Bail To Accused For The Offence Under The Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes ( Prevention Of Atrocities ) Act. Charge No. 44 Relates To Discrimination In Grant Of Bail To Co-accused In A Case Under Section 380, 411 & 457 I.P.C. Charges No. 45 And 46 Relate To Illegal Release Of Vehicles When Another Court Of Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gonda Was Empowered By The High Court To Release The Vehicles Under The Motor Vehicles Act As The Court Of Economic Offences.
The Learned Counsel For The Petitioner Challenged The Findings Of The Inquiry Officer On All The Aforesaid Charges. Hence, We Shall Consider All The Charges And Findings Of The Inquiry Officer On Those Charges One By One.
Charge No.1:
First Of All We Take Up Charge No.1. It Is In Respect Of A Judgment Delivered By The Petitioner When He Was Posted As Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gonda In Crl. Case No. 1415A Of 2000 ( State Vs. Rakesh Kumar And Others ) Under Sections 323, 325, 336, 504 And 506 I.P.C. ( Case Crime No. 138 Of 1994 ) Police Station Rehra Bazar District Gonda.
The Relevant Facts Of The Case Are That Om Prakash, Who Was An Injured Witness In The Above Case, Moved An Application Before The Hon'ble Chief Justice Alleging That In The Aforesaid Case There Were Seven Injured Persons. Out Of Them Four Injured Persons Had Been Examined And They Had Supported The Prosecution Case. There Were Two Independent Witnesses Also Of The Incident But They Had Turned Hostile And So They Were Discharged. The Doctor, Who Had Performed X-Ray Had Also Been Examined And Another Doctor And The Investigating Officer Of The Case Were To Be Examined. The Date 8.5.2000 Was Fixed In The Case In The Court Of Addl. Civil Judge (Junior Division )/ Judicial Magistrate I Class Court Room No. 3, Gonda, And On That Date He Came To The Court. He Had Engaged A Private Counsel Also For Pairvi Of The Case. His Allegation Is That On 8.5.2000 The Court Was Vacant And So The Date 20.6.2000 Was Fixed In The Case, And This Date Was Noted On The Margin Of The Order Sheet, And He Put His Initial On The Order Sheet And Then Left The Court. Thereafter The Accused Reached There. They Got The Above Date Struck Off And Obtained Order For Transfer Of The Case To The Court Of The Chief Judicial Magistrate, And Got The Case Listed On 8.5.2000 For The Remaining Evidence And Statement Of The Accused Under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The Evidence Was Closed On 22.5.2000 And Date 3.6.2000 Was Fixed For Arguments And On That Date One Witness Was Produced By The Accused As D.W.1, Who Was Initially A Prosecution Witness But Had Been Discharged Having Turned Hostile. The Petitioner Delivered Judgment Of Acquittal On 13.6.2000 On The Basis Of The Statement Of The Above Defence Witness. The Complainant Came To The Court On 20.6.2006 And Then He Came To Know That The Accused Had Already Been Acquitted On 13.6.2000. Then He Approached The Senior Prosecuting Officer, Gonda For Filing An Appeal But No Such Appeal Could Be Filed And Then He Filed This Application Before The Hon'ble Chief Justice. On The Basis Of The Above Complaint Charge No. 1 Was Framed Against The Petitioner To The Following Effect:
"That You On 13.6.2000 While Posted As Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gonda Acquitted The Accused Rakesh Kumar, Rajesh Kumar, Kamlesh Kumar And Krishna Kumar In Criminal Case No. 1415-A Of 2000 State Versus Rakesh Kumar And Others Under Section 323, 325, 336, 504 And 506 I.P.C. Crime No. 138 Of 1994 P.S. Rehra Bazar, District Gonda, Illegally, Against Evidence, Law, All Judicial Norms And Propriety And For Extraneous Consideration And You Thereby Failed To Maintain Absolute Integrity And Complete Devotion To Duty. And Thus You Committed Misconduct Within The Meaning Of Rule 3 Of The U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956."

The Petitioner Has Denied The Charge And Has Alleged That He Recalled The Case From The Court Of The Civil Judge ( Junior Division ) Which Was Lying Vacant On 8.5.2002 And Fixed The Date 22.5.2000 For Evidence Of The Doctor And Investigating Officer, And Since The Learned Counsel For The Accused Waived Formal Proof Of The Documents, Which Were To Be Proved By The Doctor And The Investigating Officer, These Witnesses Were Discharged, And Then The Statement Of The Accused Was Recorded; And After Providing Opportunity For Defence, The Case Was Decided After Hearing Arguments Of The A.P.O. And Of The Learned Counsel For The Accused, And As Such No Illegality Was Committed By Him. It Was Also Pleaded That Complainant Of This Case Dhruva Kumar ( Who Had Lodged The F.I.R ) Being Aggrieved With The Aforesaid Judgment Filed Criminal Revision No. 150 Of 2000 In The Court Of The Sessions Judge, Gonda, Which Was Transferred To The Court Of The IV Addl. Sessions Judge, Gonda For Disposal. It Was Decided By The IVAddl. Sessions Judge, Gonda Vide His Judgment And Order Dated 3.8.2001. And He Dismissed The Revision On Merits Upholding The Legality Of The Impugned Judgment And So When Legality And Propriety Of The Judgment Had Been Upheld By The Revisional Court And When That Order Of The Revisional Court Had Become Final, It Could Not Be Said That He Had Acted Illegally Or Had Misconducted.
The Learned Inquiry Officer After Dealing With The Evidence Has Recorded The Following Finding On This Charge:

" . . . . . . .It Appears That The Case Was Surreptitiously Transferred From The Court Of III Addl. Civil Judge ( J.D.) To His Own Court By The Officer Without Recording Reasons For The Transfer And Also No Notice Appears To Have Been Given To The Complainant But The Judgment Was Pronounced On 13.6.2000. When The Complainant Came To Know That The Accused Were Acquitted , The Complainant Was Taken By Surprise. Even Though The Legality Of The Impugned Judgment Has Been Upheld By The Revisional Court, It Is Evident That All Judicial Norms And Propriety Were Not Observed While Exercising Powers Under Sec. 410 Cr.P.C. To That Extent The Officer Failed To Maintain Absolute Integrity And Complete Devotion To Duty And Thus He Has Committed Misconduct Within The Meaning Of Rule 3 Of The U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. The First Charge Against The Charged Officer Is Established To That Extent."

We Are Unable To Agree With The Above Finding Of The Learned
Inquiry Officer For The Following Reasons:
. No Charge Was Framed By The Learned Inquiry Officer On The Point That Delinquent Officer Transferred The Case To His Court In Violation Of All The Judicial Norms And Propriety And That He, After The Date 20.6.2000 Had Been Given To The Complainant In The Case, Changed The Date To 22.5.2000 And Thereafter Decided The Case On 13.6.2000 Without Any Notice To The Complainant And Misconducted In This Manner. No Finding To This Effect Could Be Recorded In The Absence Of Proper Charge In Respect Of These Allegations.
. The Charge Framed By The Inquiry Officer Is Defective As Is Apparent From Perusal Of The Charge. It Has Been Alleged In It That The Delinquent Officer Misconducted By Passing An Order Of Acquittal In Favour Of The Accused Illegally Against The Evidence, Law, All Judicial Norms And Propriety And For Extraneous Consideration. The Legality And Validity Of A Judgment Are Not Within The Scope Of An Administrative Departmental Inquiry And They Are To Be Considered On Judicial Side. The Conduct Of The Delinquent Officer That He Recalled The Case To His Own Court Without Prior Notice To The Complainant And That He Changed The Date From 20.6.2000 To 22.5.2000 And Decided The Case On 13.6.2000 Without Any Notice To The Complainant, Is Within The Scope Of The Present Departmental Inquiry, But No Specific Charge Was Framed On These Allegations.
. The Charge, As It Stands Is, Regarding Validity Of Judgment Of Acquittal Passed In Criminal Case No.1415-A Of 2000 ( State Vs. Rakesh Kumar And Others ) And When The Judgment Of Acquittal Had Been Affirmed By The Revisional Court And When That Judgment Of The Revisional Court Had Become Final, It Could Not Be Held In The Departmental Inquiry On The Administrative Side That Judgment Was Illegal, Against The Evidence, Law, All Judicial Norms And Propriety, And For Extraneous Consideration. The Finding That The Delinquent Officer Acted Against All Judicial Norms And Propriety While Exercising Powers Under Section 410 Cr.P.C., And Thus, He Failed To Maintain Absolute Integrity And Devotion To Duty And Committed Misconduct Could Not Be Recorded In The Absence Of Specific Charge In Respect Of Those Allegations.

As Such We Are Of The View That The Petitioner Cannot Be Held Guilty Of Charge No, 1 Levelled Against Him And So We Hold That Charge No.1 Is Not Proved Against The Petitioner.

Charges No. 2 To 4, 6 To 27 And 29 To 38:

All These Charges Are In Respect Of Grant Of Bail For The Offences Under Sections 326, 394, 409, 467 And 471 I.P.C. All These Offences Are Punishable With Life Imprisonment And So The Petitioner Who Was Posted As Chief Judicial Magistrate At The Relevant Time Had No Jurisdiction To Grant Bail For These Offences In View Of Section 437 (1)(i) Cr.P.C. Which Runs As Under:
"(i) Such Person Shall Not Be So Released If There Appear Reasonable Grounds For Believing That He Has Been Guilty Of An Offence Punishable With Death Or Imprisonment For Life."

The Allegations Against The Petitioner In All These Charges Are That He Granted Bail To Accused Without Jurisdiction For Extraneous Consideration And Thereby He Failed To Maintain Absolute Integrity And Complete Devotion To Duty And Thus He Committed Misconduct Within The Meaning Of Rule 3 Of The U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956.

The Learned Counsel For The Petitioner Made The Following Submissions Before Us:
1.The Magistrate"s Jurisdiction To Grant Bail Is Barred In Those Cases Only Where The Prescribed Punishment Is Death Penalty Or Life Imprisonment But In Cases Which Are Punishable With Life Imprisonment Only The Magistrate Can Grant Bail Without Recording Any Special Reason.

2. There Can Be Mistake In Grant Of Bail And This Mistake Could Result Into Illegal Order And It Could Be Challenged In An Appeal Or Revision By Taking Proceedings In Higher Courts; But This Does Not Mean That The Erring Officer Committed Misconduct.

3. There Is No Evidence On Record To Show That There Was Any Extraneous Consideration In Granting Or Refusing Bail.

4. There Is Also No Finding Regarding Extraneous Consideration On Any Of The Charges.

The Contentions Of The Petitioner Are Misconceived . It Is Clear From Perusal Of The Aforesaid Sub Section (i) Of Section 437 (1) Cr.P.C. That A Magistrate Has Got No Jurisdiction To Grant Bail In Those Cases Where There Appears Reasonable Ground For Believing That The Accused Has Committed Offence Punishable With Imprisonment For Life The Only Exception To The Above Law Has Been Provided In Proviso 1 To Subsection (ii) Of The Aforesaid Section 437 (1) Which Provides That Bail May Be Granted To A Person Where He Is Under The Age Of 16 Years Or Is A Woman Or Is Sick Or Infirm. There Is No Such Case Of The Petitioner That Any Person Who Was Granted Bail By Him Was Under The Age Of 16 Years Or Was A Woman Or Was Sick Or Infirm.
The Learned Counsel For The Petitioner Has Argued That The Above Bar To Grant Of Bail Is Applicable In Respect Of Those Offences Only Which Are Punishable With Death As Well As With Life Imprisonment And It Shall Not Be Applicable In Those Cases Which Are Punishable With Life Imprisonment Only. In Support Of This Contention He Cited Before Us A Ruling Of Kerala High Court In The Case Of 'Satyam Vs. State' 1981 Cr.L.J. 1313 And Of Andhra Pradhesh High Court In 'Ashireddygari Narsimhareddy And Another Vs. State Of A.P.' 2001 Crl. L.J. 2010. We Have Carefully Gone Through These Rulings Which Are Of Hon'ble Single Judges Of Kerala High Court And Andhra Pradesh High Court, But We Are Unable To Agree With The Above Law Laid Down In These Rulings For The Reasons Enumerated Below:
. The Words Used In Section 437 (1)(i) Are "the Offences Punishable With Death Or Imprisonment For Life". The Word Used Between "death" And "imprisonment For Life" Is 'or' And Not 'and'. So It Cannot Be Said That This Bar To Power Of The Magistrate To Grant Bail, Shall Be Applicable In Those Cases Only Where The Offence Is Punishable With Death As Well As With Life Imprisonment And That It Shall Not Be Applicable When The Offence Is Punishable With Life Imprisonment Only.
. After Giving An Interpretation To The Aforesaid Clause To This Effect That The Above Bar On Power Of Magistrate Is Applicable To Those Cases Only Where The Offence Is Punishable With Death As Well As With Life Imprisonment And Not To Those Cases Which Are Punishable With Life Imprisonment Only Shall Make The Words 'punishable With Life Imprisonment' Redundant, Because If Intention Of The Legislature Was To Impose The Above Bar In Those Cases Only Where The Offence Is Punishable With Death As Well As With Life Imprisonment, The Above Object Could Be Achieved By Using The Words "offences Punishable With Death Sentence" And Then All The Offences Punishable With Death Sentence As Well As The Life Sentence Would Have Been Excluded From The Magisterial Jurisdiction To Grant Bail, And As Such Use Of The Words "punishable With Life Imprisonment" Shall Become Redundant Because In India Every Offence Punishable With Death Sentence Is Punishable With Life Imprisonment Also In The Alternative. There Is Only One Exception To It Which Is Section 303 I.P.C. But That Section Has Been Declared To Be Unconstitutional By The Hon'ble Apex Court. As Such The Bar To Grant Of Bail In Offences Punishable With Death Sentence As Well As With Life Imprisonment Could Be Achieved By Using The Words "death Sentence Only In Section 437(1)(i) Cr.P.C. And There Could Have Been No Requirement To Use The Words "punishable With Life Imprisonment".
. The Law Of Harmonious Interpretation Is That Every Word Used In The Law Must Be Given Its Natural And Practical Meaning And An Interpretation Which Renders Some Provisions Redundant Cannot Be Accepted, And The True Import Of The Above Words Used In The Sub-section (i) Is That The Jurisdiction Of The Magistrate Is Barred In Those Cases Also Which Are Not Punishable With Death But With Life Imprisonment.
. The Hon'ble Apex Court In The Case Of 'Gurcharan Singh And Others Vs. State ( Delhi Administration ) AIR 1978 SC 179 And In 'Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs. N.C.T. Delhi & Another '2001 (2) JIC 50 (S.C.) Has Laid Down That The Bar On Power Of Magistrate To Grant Of Bail As Contained In Section 437(1)(i) Cr.P.C. Is Applicable To Those Cases Also Which Are Punishable With Life Imprisonment And In View Of The Above Rulings Of The Hon'ble Apex Court, The Contrary Views Of The Calcutta And Andhra Pradesh High Court Cannot Be Accepted.

The Learned Counsel For The Petitioner Made The Following Submissions Also Before Us:
. If There Was A Mistake In Grant Of Bail And If An Illegal Order Had Been Passed By The Magistrate, The Same Could Be Challenged In An Appeal Or Revision, And Only This Fact That The Officer Has Passed An Erroneous Order Does Not Mean That He Was Dishonest And Committed Misconduct. Even Wrong Interpretation Of Law Cannot Be Treated To Be A Ground For Misconduct, And Wrong Exercise Of Jurisdiction Is Not Always Misconduct And There Must Be Preponderance Of Probability To Entertain Doubt Regarding Possibility Of Doubtful Integrity And In The Present Case There Was Nothing On Record To Show Any Extraneous Consideration For Grant Of Bail.
In Support Of This Contention He Referred To The Following Rulings Of The Hon'ble Apex Court:
(i) 'Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs. Union Of India And Others' A.I.R. 1999 Supreme Court 2881;

(ii) P.C.Joshi Vs. State Of U.P. And Others' (2001) 6 SCC 491,
. Unintentional Error Of Judgment Is Not Misconduct And Improper Motive Should Not Be Attributed To Every Error. In Support Of This Contention He Referred To The Following Two Rulings Of This Court:
(i) Virendra Pal Singh Vs. State Of U.P. And Another (2001) 3 ESC 1540;

(ii) 'O.P.Rudra Vs. The High Court Of Judicature, Allahabad And Others' (1999) 3 ESC 2106 (Allahabad),
. It Is Not Enough To Charge A Government Servant With Having Done An Act With Ulterior Motive And For Extraneous Consideration But He Must Be Told As To What Precisely Is The Motive Attributed To Him And What Was The Extraneous Consideration And The Vagueness Of Charge Vitiates The Inquiry Proceedings And Punishment. He Cited The Following Rulings In Support Of This Contention:

(i) 'State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others Vs. Salig Ram Sharma' AIR 1960 Allahabad 543;

(ii) 'Sawai Singh Vs. State Of Rajasthan' AIR 1986 SC 995.

(iii) 'Ramesh Chander Singh Vs. High Court Of Allahabad & Another' JT 2007 (4) SC 135.

We Have Considered The Above Contention And Have Also Gone Through All These Rulings . It Is To Be Seen That The Law That Bail Is Not To Be Granted By Magistrate In Those Cases Which Are Punishable With Death Sentence Or Life Imprisonment, As Contained In Section 437 (1)(i) Cr.P.C. Is Quite Clear And This Law Is Applicable To Those Cases Also Which Are Punishable With Life Imprisonment Only And Not With Death Sentence. If A Person Has Not Gone Through Relevant Law And Is Ignorant Of Law, The Legal Position Is That Ignorance Of Law Is No Excuse. The Present Case Is Not Of Jurisdictional Error In Grant Of Bail In A Solitary Case But In 35 Cases ( Charges No. 2 To 4, 6 To 27, 29 To 38 ) This Jurisdictional Error Was Committed By Him. This Aspect Of Jurisdictional Error Had Already Been Pointed Out To Him While Awarding Adverse Entry To Him In The Year 1986-87 For Granting Bail In A Case Under Section 307 I.P.C. Now He Cannot Say That He Was Ignorant Of The Correct Legal Position And His Repeated Recurrence Of The Same Mistake Leads To The Irresistible Conclusion That He Granted Bail For Extraneous Considerations In All These Cases.
In View Of These Facts, We Are Of The View That The Learned Inquiry Officer Has Rightly Held That These Charges Were Sufficiently Proved Against Him. We Are In Agreement With His Finding On These Charges And Confirm The Same.

Charge No.39:
Now We Take Up Charge No. 39. This Charge Is That The Petitioner Granted Bail To Accused Asghar, Murtuza, Mohd. Iliyas And Salim In Case Crime No. 2 Of 2001 Under Sections 504 And 506 I.P.C. And 3/5/8, Prevention Of Cow Slaughter Act, But He Rejected Bail Of Shukru And Daddan In Case Crime No. 170 Of 2001 Under Sections 3/5/8, Prevention Of Cow Slaughter Act And In This Way He Acted In Illegal Manner For Extraneous Considerations. The Petitioner Has Given Explanation In His Reply That In The Former Case The Only Allegation Against The Accused Was That They Had Beaten Two Cows, And So The Accused Were Granted Bail, But In The Second Case The Allegation Against The Accused Was Of Carrying The Cows In A Vehicle To Slaughter House, And Taking Into Consideration The Seriousness Of The Charge He Had Refused Bail. The Learned Inquiry Officer Has Pointed Out That These Reasons Were Not Specified In The Bail Order. It Is To Be Seen That In Magisterial Courts There Is A Heavy Rush Of Work And It Is Always Not Possible To Write Speaking Order On Each And Every Bail Application, But When The Officer Has Given An Explanation That Is To Be Considered In The Light Of The Facts Of The Prosecution Case. On Perusal Of The Prosecution Case In Both These Crime Numbers We Are Satisfied With The Explanation Of The Petitioner And So We Hold That This Charge No. 39 Is Not Proved Against The Petitioner. The Finding Of The Learned Inquiry Officer On This Charge Is Not Correct And So It Is Set Aside.
Charges No. 40 To 43:
These Charges Are In Respect Of Grant Of Bail In The Offences Punishable Under Section 3 (1)(X) Of The Scheduled Castes And Scheduled Tribes ( Prevention Of Atrocities ) Act. The Charge Against The Petitioner Is That These Offences Were Triable By The Court Of Special Judge And So He Had No Jurisdiction To Grant Bail For These Offences. The Second Allegation Against Him Is That In Similar Circumstances He Granted Bail To Accused In One Case And Refused Bail To Accused In Another Case.
It Is To Be Seen That All The Offences Under The Scheduled Castes And Scheduled Tribes ( Prevention Of Atrocities ) Act Are Cognizable And Non-bailable. The Offence Under Section 3(1)(X) Of The Scheduled Castes And Scheduled Tribes ( Prevention Of Atrocities ) Act Is Punishable With Imprisonment , Which Shall Not Be Less Than Six Months But Which May Be Extended Upto Five Years With Fine. It Is True That The Offence Under The Above Act Is Triable By Special Judge, But It Is Also To Be Seen That Under The Above Act No Power To Take Cognizance Has Been Conferred Upon The Special Judge And So The Legal Position Is That Challans Of Accused Are Produced Before The Magistrate, And Charge Sheets Are Also Filed In The Courts Of The Respective Magistrates According To Their Territorial Jurisdiction And Then Those Cases Are Committed To The Court Of Session From Where They Are Transferred To The Court Of Special Judge, And So These Cases Are Not Such Cases Where The Accused Is Produced Before The Special Judge Directly, But The Accused Are Produced At The Initial Stage Before The Magistrate.
Whenever An Accused Under Custody Is Produced Before The Magistrate, He Has Got A Right To Move Bail Application Before The Magistrate. The Provisions Of Section 437 Cr.P.C. Shall Be Applicable In Respect Of Powers Of Magistrate To Grant Of Bail In Such Cases. Since The Offence Under Section 3(1)(x) Of The Scheduled Castes And Scheduled Tribes ( Prevention Of Atrocities ) Act Is Punishable With Imprisonment Upto Five Years Only, The Magistrate Has Got Jurisdiction To Grant Bail To The Accused Under Section 3(1)(X) Of The Aforesaid Act As The Offence Is Neither Punishable With Death Sentence Nor With Life Imprisonment, For Which There Is A Bar In Section 437(1)(i), Cr.P.C. As Such It Is Clear That The Petitioner, Who Was Posted As Chief Judicial Magistrate At Relevant Time, Had Jurisdiction To Grant Bail In All These Cases Under The Provisions Of The Scheduled Castes And Scheduled Tribes ( Prevention Of Atrocities ) Act And The Charge Against Him That He Granted Bail Without Jurisdiction And The Finding Of The Learned Inquiry Officer To This Effect That He Had No Jurisdiction To Grant Bail Are Erroneous. He Had Jurisdiction To Grant Bail In Respect Of These Offences Under Section 437 Cr.P.C.
Now We Take Up The Second Part Of The Charge Regarding Discrimination In Grant Of Bail.
In This Connection, Charges No. 40 And 41 Against The Petitioner Are That In Case Crime No. 417-A Of 2000 Under Sections 147, 323, 504 And 506 I,P.C. And Section 3(1)(X) Of The Scheduled Castes And Scheduled Tribes ( Prevention Of Atrocities ) Act, He Granted Bail To Accused Persons, But In Similar Case Crime No. 127 Of 2000 Under Sections 323, 504, 506, 452 I.P.C. And Section 3(1)(X) Of The Said Act He Refused Bail To Accused Persons In An Arbitrary Manner. The Officer Has Explained That In Case Crime No.417-A Of 2000, Bail Was Granted To The Accused On The Ground Of Cross Case, As The Accused In The Cross Case Were Already Granted Bail, And In Case Crime No. 127 Of 2000 There Were Serious Allegations Against The Accused Persons That They Entered The House Of The Complainant And Misbehaved With Ladies In The Complainant's House, And So Bail Was Refused To The Accused In This Case. We Are Of The View That This Explanation Is Satisfactory. Thus, Both The Charges No. 40 And 41 Are Not Proved.
In Charges No. 42 And 43 The Allegations Are That In Case Crime No. 341 Of 2000 Under Sections 354, 504, 506 I.P.C. And 3(1)(X) Of The Scheduled Castes And Scheduled Tribes ( Prevention Of Atrocities ) Act The Petitioner Granted Bail To The Accused Persons While In Case Crime No. 127 Of 2000 Under Sections 323,504, 506, 452 I.P.C. And 3(1)(X) Of The Scheduled Castes And Scheduled Tribes ( Prevention Of Atrocities ) Act He Did Not Grant Bail. The Officer Has Explained That Nature Of Allegations In Case Crime No.127 Of 2000 Was More Serious As There Were Allegations That The Accused Had Forcibly Entered The House Of The Complainant And Had Caused Injuries To The Persons Including Ladies Inside The House And There Were No Such Allegations Of House Trespassing In Case Crime No. 341 Of 2000. Hence, Bail Was Granted In Case Crime No. 341/2000 But It Was Refused In Case Crime No.127 Of 2000 Taking Into Consideration The Alleged House Trespass Committed By The Accused And The Offences Allegedly Committed In The House Of The Complainant. We Are Satisfied With The Above Explanation Of The Officer And So We Are Of The View That Charges No. 42 And 43 Are Also Not Proved Against The Petitioner. The Findings Of The Learned Inquiry Officer On Above Charges Are Set Aside.
Charge No. 44:
This Charge Is In Respect Of Grant Of Bail To Accused Krishna Kumar In Case Crime No. 219 Of 2000 Under Sections 380, 411 And 457 I.P.C. And Refusal Of Bail To Co-accused Ram Bilas In The Same Case. It May Be Mentioned That There Was Recovery Of Stolen Property Worth Rs.15,000/- From Krishna Kumar But He Was Granted Bail. On The Other Hand, Accused Ram Bilas Was Not Named In The F.I.R. Nor Any Recovery Was Made From Him. Even Then His Bail Application Was Rejected.
The Officer Has Given Explanation That Items Recovered From Possession Of Krishna Kumar Were Commonly Available And So He Granted Bail To Krishna Kumar, But He Refused Bail To Ram Bilas As He Resided Near International Border Of India And Nepal And So There Was A Possibility That He May Not Appear To Face Trial After Being Released On Bail And Recovery Could Also Be Made From Him If He Is Remanded To Police Custody. The Learned Inquiry Officer Has Pointed Out That There Was No Application For Police Custody. It Is To Be Seen That In This Case When The Person From Whom Recovery Had Been Made Was Granted Bail, There Was No Justification For Refusing Bail To A Person Who Was Not Named In The F.I.R. And From Whose Possession No Recovery Was Made. If There Was An Apprehension That He May Dis-appear On Being Released On Bail Suitable Conditions Could Be Imposed At The Time Of Granting Bail To Him, But There Was No Justification For Granting Bail To One Accused And Refusing Bail To Another Accused In The Same Case, When The Case Of Ram Bilas Stood On A Better Footing For Grant Of Bail Than That Of Krishna Kumar . His Above Arbitrary And Discriminatory Act In Granting Bail To One Accused And Refusing Bail To Another Accused In The Same Case Goes To Show His Dishonesty And Leads To A Conclusion That The Orders Were Passed For Extraneous Consideration And We Are Of The View That Charge No. 44 Is Proved Against The Petitioner.
Charges No. 45 And 46:
These Two Charges Are In Respect Of Release Of Vehicles Under The Provisions Of The Motor Vehicles Act. The Charge Against The Petitioner Is That Special Courts For Economic Offences Had Been Created To Deal With Such Cases And This Jurisdiction Was Conferred Upon The Ist. Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, So The Chief Judicial Magistrate Had No Jurisdiction To Deal With The Cases. The Petitioner Has Taken Defence That Every Magistrate In The District Has Territorial Jurisdiction Over The Entire District And So He Had Jurisdiction To Deal With These Matters Also.
The Learned Counsel For The Petitioner Has Also Cited Before Us Rulings Of Rajasthan High Court In The Cases Of 'Mahesh Chand And Etc. Vs. State Of Rajasthan And Etc.' 1985 Cr.L.J. 301 And 'Chauthmal Vs. State Of Rajasthan' 1982 Cr.L.J. 1403 In Support Of The Above Contention. We Have Gone Through Both These Rulings. This Legal Position That Magistrate Has Got Territorial Jurisdiction Over The Entire District Is Not Disputed, But The Magistrates Have To Work According To Distribution Of Work Done On The Administrative Side. Moreover, When Any Court Is Created Exclusively For Trial Of A Particular Type Of Cases,then Jurisdiction Of All Other Courts Comes To An End In Respect Of Those Matters. In The Present Case, The Court Of Ist. A.C.J.M. Was Designated As Special Court For Economic Offences And It Had Exclusive Jurisdiction To Hear Cases Of Economic Offences. So Jurisdiction Of The Chief Judicial Magistrate To Take Cognizance Of Such Economic Offences, Came To An End After Establishment Of That Court. As Such, The Petitioner Had No Jurisdiction To Take Cognizance Of Those Cases Which Were Cognizable By Ist. Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate As Special Court For Economic Offences.
The Petitioner Has Also Alleged In His Reply That The Vehicles Which He Had Released Were Not Involved In Economic Offences. It Is,however, To Be Seen That The A.P.O. Had Taken A Plea In His Report That Offences Alleged In The Cases Were Economic Offences Triable By The Court Of Ist. Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate. He Had Also Taken A Plea That The Court Could Take Cognizance Of The Matter And Pass Release Order Only After Submission Of Challan Under Section 207, Motor Vehicles Act And Till Submission Of That Challan The Court Had No Jurisdiction To Pass Any Order In The Matter. Even Then The Petitioner Passed Order For Release Of The Vehcile, Though The Matter Was Cognizable By The Court Of Ist.Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, And No Challan Under Section 207, Motor Vehicles Act Had Been Submitted In The Case. In This Way, He Acted In Illegal Manner, And Thus Charges No. 45 And 46 Are Also Proved Against The Petitioner.
Learned Counsel For The Petitioner Submitted That In This Case The Petitioner Was Not Provided Opportunity To Cross Examine The Reporting Officer Shri V.N. Singh, Then District Judge, Gonda Though He Had Moved An Application To This Effect, And In This Way The Petitioner Has Been Deprived Of His Right To Defence. In Support Of This Contention He Cited Before Us A Ruling Of The Hon'ble Apex Court In 'State Of Punjab Vs. Dewan Chunni Lal' A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2086 In Which The Same View Has Been Taken. We Have Gone Through This Ruling. In This Case The Charges Were Based On The Adverse Reports Of Superior Officers Regarding Inefficiency And Dishonesty Of The Concerned Employee And So Their Non-examination By The Department Was Held To Be Fatal For The Case. In The Present Case The Report Of Shri V.N.Singh, Then District Judge , Gonda Was Based On Record Of Judicial Cases And Not On His Personal Knowledge And So There Was No Necessity To Examine Him. As Such This Ruling Does Not Render Any Help To The Petitioner.
The Position In This Way Is That Charges No. 1 And 39 To 43 Are Not Proved Against The Petitioner But The Remaining Charges No. 2 To 4, 6 To 27, 29 To 38 And 44 To 46 Are Sufficiently Proved Against The Petitioner.
Now The Question As To What Should Be The Fate Of This Petition In View Of The Above Findings. It Is To Be Seen That The Petitioner Was Awarded Punishment Of Dismissal From Service On The Basis That Charges No. 1 To 4, 6 To 27 And 29 To 46 Were Proved Against Him. Out Of The Aforesaid Charges We Have Held That Charges No. 1 And 39 To 43 Are Not Proved Against The Petitioner. So Now The Question Is Whether The Same Punishment Of Dismissal From Service Should Be Maintained Against The Petitioner Or He Should Be Awarded Any Lesser Sentence In View Of The Fact That Charges No. 1 And 39 To 43 Have Been Found By Us To Be Not Proved Against Him.
It Is To Be Seen That Even If Six Charges Bearing Serial Nos. 1 And 39 To 43 Have Not Been Found To Be Proved, The Remaining 38 Charges Bearing Number 2 To 4, 6 To 27, 29 To 38 And 44 To 46 Have Been Found To Be Proved Against Him. Thus, Majority Of Charges Have Been Found Proved Against The Delinquent Officer.
We Also Examined The Character Roll Of The Petitioner For Ascertainment Of His Honesty And Integrity And Found That In The Year 1986-87 Also He Was Given Adverse Entry For Granting Bail In A Case Under Section 307 I.P.C. In The Year 2000-2001 He Was Given Adverse Entry For Doubtful Integrity And There Is Description Of Corruption And Mis-handling Of Cases.

Under These Circumstances, We Are Of The View That There Is No Question Of Re-consideration Of The Quantum Of Punishment Awarded By The Full Court Nor Any Question Of Reduction Of Punishment And The Order Of Punishment Of Dismissal Passed Against The Petitioner Deserves To Be Maintained.

The Writ Petition, Therefore, Deserves To Be Dismissed And It Is Accordingly Dismissed.

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